


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The Isthmian Canal

By

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Canal Commission



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THE ISTHMIAN CANAL.

By Lieut. Col. GEO. W. GOETHALS, U. S. Army,
Chairman and Chief Engineer, Isthmian Canal Commission.

A canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans has occupied public attention for upward of four centuries, during which period various routes have been proposed, each having certain special or peculiar advantages. It was not until the nineteenth century, however, that any definite action was taken looking toward its accomplishment.

In 1876 an organization was perfected in France for making surveys and collecting data on which to base the construction of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama, and in 1878 a concession for prosecuting the work was secured from the Colombian Government.

In May, 1879, an international congress was convened under the auspices of Ferdinand de Lesseps, to consider the question of the best location and plan of the canal. This congress, after a two weeks' session, decided in favor of the Panama route and of a sea-level canal without locks. De Lesseps's success with the Suez Canal made him a strong advocate of the sea-level type, and his opinion had considerable influence in the final decision.

Immediately following this action the Panama Canal Company was organized under the general laws of France, with Ferdinand de Lesseps as its president. The concession granted in 1878 by Colombia was purchased by the company, and the stock was successfully floated in December, 1880. The two years following were devoted largely to surveys, examinations, and preliminary work. In the first plan adopted the canal was to be 29.5 feet deep, with a ruling bottom width of 72 feet. Leaving Colon, the canal passed through low ground to the valley of the Chagres River at Gatun, a distance of about 6 miles; thence through this valley, for 21 miles, to Obispo, where, leaving the river, it crossed the continental divide at Culebra by means of a tunnel, and reached the Pacific through the valley

of the Rio Grande. The difference in the tides of the two oceans, 9 inches in either direction from the mean in the Atlantic and from 9 to 11 feet from the same datum in the Pacific, was to be overcome and the final currents reduced by a proper sloping of the bottom of the Pacific portion of the canal. No provisions were made for the control of the Chagres River.

In the early eighties after a study of the flow due to the tidal differences a tidal lock near the Pacific was provided. Various schemes were also proposed for the control of the Chagres, the most prominent being the construction of a dam at Gamboa. The dam as proposed afterwards proved to be impracticable, and this problem remained, for the time being, unsolved. The tunnel through the divide was also abandoned in favor of an open cut.

Work was prosecuted on the sea-level canal until 1887, when a change to the lock type was made, in order to secure the use of the canal for navigation as soon as possible. It was agreed at that time that the change in plan did not contemplate abandonment of the sea-level canal, which was ultimately to be secured, but merely its postponement for the time being. In this new plan the summit level was placed above the flood line of the Chagres River, to be supplied with water from that stream by pumps. Work was pushed forward until 1889, when the company went into bankruptcy; and on February 4 of that year a liquidator was appointed to take charge of its affairs. Work was suspended on May 15, 1889. The New Panama Canal Company was organized in October, 1894, when work was again resumed, on the plan recommended by a commission of engineers.

This plan contemplated a sea-level canal from Limon Bay to Bohio, where a dam across the valley created a lake extending to Bas Obispo, the difference in level being overcome by two locks; the summit level extended from Bas Obispo to Paraiso, reached by two more locks, and was supplied with water by a feeder from an artificial reservoir created by a dam at Alhajuela, in the upper Chagres Valley. Four locks were located on the Pacific side, the two middle ones at Pedro Miguel combined in a flight.

A second or alternative plan was proposed at the same time, by which the summit level was to be a lake formed by the Bohio dam, fed directly by the Chagres. Work was continued on this plan until

the rights and property of the new company were purchased by the United States.

The United States, not unmindful of the advantages of an isthmian canal, had from time to time made investigations and surveys of the various routes. With a view to government ownership and control Congress directed an investigation of the Nicaraguan Canal for which a concession had been granted to a private company. The resulting report brought about such a discussion of the advantages of the Panama route to the Nicaraguan route, that by an act of Congress, approved March 3, 1889, a commission was appointed to—

make full and complete investigation of the Isthmus of Panama, with a view to the construction of a canal * * * to connect the Atlantic and Pacific oceans * * * and particularly to investigate the two routes known respectively as the Nicaragua route and the Panama route, with a view to determining the most practicable and feasible route for such canal, together with the approximate and probable cost of constructing a canal at each of the two or more of said routes.

The commission reported on November 16, 1901, in favor of Panama, and recommended the lock type of canal. The plan consisted of a sea-level section from Colon to Bohio, where a dam across the Chagres Valley created a summit level 82 to 90 feet above the sea, reached by two locks. The lake or summit level extended from Bohio to Pedro Miguel, where two locks connected it with a pool 28 feet above mean tide, extending to Miraflores, the location of the final lock. The ruling bottom width of the canal prism was fixed at 150 feet, increased at the curves and in the submerged channels. In Panama Bay the width was fixed at 200 feet, and in the artificial channel in Limon Bay 500 feet was adopted, with turning places 800 feet wide. The minimum depth was 35 feet, and the locks were to have usable lengths of 740 feet and widths of 84 feet. The commission assessed the value of the rights, franchises, concessions, lands, unfinished work, plans, and other property, including the railroad of the New Panama Canal Company, at \$40,000,000.

By act of Congress, approved June 28, 1902, the President of the United States was authorized to acquire, at a cost not exceeding \$40,000,000, the property rights of the New Panama Canal Company on the Isthmus of Panama, and also to secure from the Republic of Colombia perpetual control of a strip of land not less than 6 miles

wide, extending from the Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean, and—

the right * * * to excavate, construct, and to perpetually maintain, operate, and protect thereon a canal of such depth and capacity as will afford convenient passage of ships of the greatest tonnage and draft now in use.

In event the provisions for the purchase, and for securing the necessary concession from Colombia could not be carried out, the President was authorized to secure the rights necessary for the construction of the Nicaraguan Canal.

The law also provided, after the foregoing arrangements had been perfected, that—

the President shall then, through the Isthmian Canal Commission * * * cause to be excavated, constructed, and completed a canal from the Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean. Such canal shall be of sufficient capacity and depth as shall afford convenient passage for vessels of the largest tonnage and greatest draft now in use, and such as may be reasonably anticipated.

To enable the President to carry out these provisions certain sums were appropriated and a bond issue, not to exceed one hundred and thirty millions of dollars, was authorized. By this act Congress, in accepting the estimates accompanying the report of the commission of 1901, adopted the type proposed by the board, or a lock canal.

Pursuant to the legislation, negotiations were entered into with Colombia and with the New Panama Canal Company, with the end that a treaty was made with the Republic of Panama granting to the United States control of a 10-mile strip, constituting the Canal Zone, with the right to construct, maintain, and operate a canal. This treaty was ratified by the Republic of Panama on December 2, 1903, and by the United States on February 23, 1904.

The formal transfer of the property of the New Panama Canal Company on the Isthmus was made on May 4, 1904, after which the United States began the organization of a force for the construction of the lock type of canal, in the meantime continuing the excavation by utilizing the French material and equipment and such labor as was procurable on the Isthmus.

The question of a sea-level canal was again agitated, and secured such recognition that the President convened an international board of engineers, consisting of 13 members, to assemble at Washington on the 1st day of September, 1905, for the purpose of considering the various plans for the construction of the canal that would be submitted to it.

The plans submitted may be briefly summarized as—

(1) That of the commission of 1901, which has already been explained.

(2) A lock canal with terminal lakes proposed by Mr. Lindon W. Bates, and for which three projects were proposed. The one which he appeared to favor contemplated a summit level of 62 feet above the sea, created by a dam at Bohio, and an intermediate level of $33\frac{1}{2}$ feet above mean tide, effected by a dam at Mindi. This plan provided four locks—at Mindi, Bohio, Pedro Miguel, and Sosa. A variant of the plan contemplated a dam at Gatun instead of at Bohio, showing that, at least for a 30-foot head, the Gatun location was not considered by him as unfavorable or offering any difficulties respecting the foundations. His other plans were modifications of this, the summit levels being 27 or 62 feet, but in each instance the lock type was advocated.

(3) The plan proposed by Mr. Bunau-Varilla, carried out the ideas of the first French company, namely, the construction of a lock canal with a summit level 130 feet above mean tide, to be ultimately converted into a sea-level canal, or what he calls the Straits of Panama. The locks were to be constructed so that as the levels were deepened by dredging they could be eliminated, navigation continuing during the enlargement and transformation. The material removed by the dredges was to be deposited in the lake formed of the upper Chagres River by a dam at Gamboa, and any suitable locations in the various pools between the locks. In commenting on this plan the Board of Consulting Engineers concluded that—

After a full and careful consideration of all the features of Mr. Bunau-Varilla's plan, the board is of the opinion that it should not be adopted for the Panama Canal for the following reasons:

1. The construction of the large locks required under the present law and necessary for the accommodation of the traffic seeking the canal after its completion makes it quite impossible to complete the preliminary lock canal even nearly within the period stated.

2. The excessive cost of transformation added to the loss of costly locks and other appurtenant structures required by the preliminary lock canal.

3. If the lock canal is likely to be retained for many years, it should be made for the most efficient service, and not be encumbered with modifications in lock construction which would prove inconvenient in use.

(4) A plan proposed by Maj. Cassius E. Gillette, a lock canal with a summit level 100 feet above mean tide by the construction of a dam across the Chagres Valley at Gatun.

No sea-level plan was submitted for consideration, so that the board outlined a general plan of its own, and for purposes of comparison adopted as the lock type a 60-foot summit level canal. Two levels were used, the summit level was carried by an earth dam at Bohio, and the intermediate level by an earth dam at Gatun, each dam sustaining a head of 30 feet. It is to be noted that no difficulties were anticipated in the construction of these dams, and there was no dread or fear of the foundations.

As the result of its deliberations, the board submitted a majority report and a minority report signed by five of its members, the former advocating a sea-level canal and the latter a lock canal, with the summit level 85 feet above mean tide.

The Isthmian Canal Commission, with one dissenting voice, recommended to the President the adoption of the lock type recommended by the minority, which was also strongly advocated by the then chief engineer, Mr. John F. Stevens. The President, in the message to Congress, dated February 19, 1906, stated:

The law now on our statute books seems to contemplate a lock canal. In my judgment a lock canal, as herein recommended, is advisable. If the Congress directs that a sea-level canal be constructed its direction will, of course, be carried out; otherwise the canal will be built on substantially the plan for a lock canal outlined in the accompanying papers, such changes being made, of course, as may be found actually necessary, including possibly the change recommended by the Secretary of War as to the site of the dam on the Pacific side.

On June 29, 1906, Congress provided that a lock type of canal be constructed across the Isthmus of Panama, of the general type proposed by the minority of the Board of Consulting Engineers, and work has continued along these lines. As originally proposed, the plan consisted of a practically straight channel 500 feet wide, 41 feet deep from deep water in the Caribbean to Gatun, where an ascent to the 85-foot level was made by three locks in flight. The level is maintained by a dam approximately 7,700 feet long, one-half mile wide at the base, 100 feet wide at the top, constructed to 135 feet above mean tide. The lake formed by this dam, 171 square miles in extent, carried navigation to Pedro Miguel, where a lock of 30 feet lift carried the vessel down to a lake 55 feet above mean tide, extending to Sosa Hill, where two locks overcame the difference of level between the lake surface and the Pacific. Nineteen and eight-hundredths miles of the distance from Gatun to Sosa Hill had a

channel 1,000 feet at the bottom, a minimum channel for $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles through Culebra of 200 feet at the bottom. The balance of the distance varied in width to 800 feet, the larger portion of the entire canal being not less than 500 feet. The depth of water was fixed at 45 feet. The lake assured a perfect control of the Chagres River.

Certain changes have been made in the original project, the most important being the withdrawal of the locks from Sosa to Miraflores, which was recommended and adopted in December, 1907. This resulted in a change in the direction of the channel in Panama Bay. A breakwater is being constructed from Sosa to Naos Island which, by cutting off the silt-bearing cross current, which has always been troublesome, protects the channel against silting.

A second change is the widening of the $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles of Culebra cut to a width of 300 feet at the bottom. This was done by executive order and was not made on the recommendation of the commission.

A third change is the location of the breakwaters in Colon Harbor. The necessity for these breakwaters was made apparent in the latter part of January, when a storm of some magnitude seriously interfered with shipping. As originally proposed for both the sea level and lock types, the breakwaters were parallel to the axis of the channel excavated in Limon Bay. If so constructed, sufficient area would not be given to dissipate the waves entering head on into the channel, and they would not afford much, if any, protection to shipping. These breakwaters are to be built out from Manzanillo Island and Toro Point, so as to give a sheltered anchorage, and also an opportunity for such expansion to the waves as to break them up.

A fourth change is in the dimensions of the locks. As proposed by the minority they were 900 feet by 95 feet, usable lengths and widths. These dimensions were subsequently changed by the commission at the instigation of the President to dimensions 100 feet wide and 1,000 feet long. The width was again increased to 110 feet on the recommendation of the General Board of the Navy, so as to accommodate any possible increase in beam of future battleships.

The Gatun dam is to consist of two piles of rock 1,200 feet apart and carried up to 60 feet above mean tide. The space between them and up to the required height is to be filled by selected material deposited in place by the hydraulic process. During the construction of the north side of the south rock pile a slip occurred in November last at the

crossing of the French Canal. This was the fifth slip that occurred at this point, the rock settling to some extent, but generally slipping sidewise until the angle of repose was reached. In this connection it is to be noted that the silt deposits in the channel had not been removed. This slip would probably have passed unnoticed, as did the former ones, but for the fact that at the time a flood in the Chagres River had attained such proportions as to cover a portion of the Panama Railroad tracks just south of Gatun. A newspaper correspondent, going from Colon to Panama, saw his opportunity for a sensational story, and attributed the flood to the dropping of the Gatun dam into the subterranean lake under the dam and locks, which another faker had previously discovered, and the news of the destruction of the Gatun dam was cabled to the States.

The slip did not affect the south slope or side of the rock pile. It was entirely local and did not in any way interfere with the work. It would not have occurred had steps been taken during construction to give the proper slope to the rock pile, but economy of time and money did not warrant such precaution. As stated by one of the engineering publications, "We can state from actual personal examination that this incident has absolutely no engineering significance."

As a result, however, the public is told that dire disaster will follow the undertaking unless the present plans are abandoned and the Straits of Panama constructed, that is a sea-level canal across the Isthmus 500 to 600 feet wide. To accomplish this, however, a lock canal must be built first, and subsequently widened and deepened until the ideal is reached. There is no data available for such a canal. With mountains instead of hills to be removed estimates are, of course, impossible; so the most optimistic figures, suitable alone to the ideal, are offered as a bait. In any event it is also claimed that Bohio should have been selected for the site of the dam in lieu of Gatun.

As between Gatun and Bohio, at both places the distance from the natural surface to the rock is so great that any attempt to found the dam on the last-named material will be attended by enormous expense. At Bohio the gorge in its lower strata is filled with water-bearing gravel and to make the dam safe the underflow through these strata would have to be cut off by some means extending down 165 feet. No such strata exist at Gatun, so, for this reason alone, leaving out of consideration the advantages in the control of the

Chagres River and to navigation by reason of the greater extent of lake, Gatun offers the better site.

Both the majority and minority of the Board of Consulting Engineers considered Gatun a suitable location for a dam; the former adopted it for the typical lock canal used for comparison with the sea-level canal, the latter for the 85-foot summit-level canal. The majority, however, feared the existence of an underground flow in case of the higher dam, but investigations have failed to disclose any. The great mass of underlying material is not sandy and gravelly deposits as was supposed, but a mixture of these materials so firmly cemented together with clay as to make the strata in which they occur impervious to water.

I venture the statement, without fear of contradiction, that the site of no public or private work of any kind has received such a thorough and exhaustive examination and investigation as the foundation of the dam and locks at Gatun. There is no longer a doubt concerning any of the underlying strata; neither the impermeability, nor the ability of the foundations to bear the loads that will be brought upon them, can be questioned if the data be carefully and impartially examined. The investigations fail to disclose any water-bearing strata or the existence of that underground stream with a discharge equal to the Chagres River itself, which was recently asserted as a fact on the floor of the Senate.

In this connection the statement is also made that the change in the location of the locks at the Pacific end was due to our demonstrated inability to construct the dams, and that as the foundation at Gatun is of the same material, it necessarily followed that the Gatun dam is also impossible of accomplishment.

The majority of the Board of Consulting Engineers in its report states that—

The dam at La Boca, between San Juan Point and the Sosa Hill, unless carried down to bed rock at that location, would be placed upon a far worse foundation than that proposed at Gatun or Mindi. The La Boca site is one covered by an ooze of mud or silt, with some sandy material overlying the rock. * * * Unless some feature equivalent to that of a heavy masonry core characterized the design of the dam at this point, or unless a resort be made to dredging down to bed rock or near to it, and refilling with suitable material, or an earth dam at this location be made very massive, it would be in grave danger of being pushed bodily out of place by the pressure due to the head of water in the reservoir.

We found the material in the foundations of these dams not only worse than at Gatun, but in nowise comparable. In the former a covering of ooze and silt, in the latter firm ground with a few soft or marshy spots.

I know that the La Boca dams could be built to safely withstand the heads of water in the resulting lake by adopting either the method of dredging out the ooze or by giving massive dimensions to the superimposed structure. The engineering committee and the majority of the commission preferred the former method. In either case the cost would exceed the original estimates, and in addition it is a military blunder to push the locks to and beyond the proper line of defense, especially when the canal is a military necessity to this country. That the dams could be built is evidenced by the fact that the west toe of the Sosa-Corozal dam was carried across the valley on the ooze as an embankment for a railroad to be utilized in transporting stone for the Pacific locks. The charge, therefore, that the dams could not be constructed is not true, and the analogy at Gatun does not follow. Nor is there any truth in the statement that the military necessity was an afterthought as has been insinuated.

I visited the Isthmus in 1905 with a committee of the Board of National Coast Defenses, with which I was associated at that time, for a study of the defenses of the canal. When the location of the locks at the Pacific end was fixed, I was directed to call the Secretary of War's attention to the military necessity of withdrawing the locks to the interior. This I did, with the result that in forwarding the report of the Board of Consulting Engineers to the President he calls attention to the fact as follows:

The great objection to the locks at Sosa Hill is the possibility of their destruction by the fire from an enemy's ship. If, as has been suggested to me by officers of this department entitled to speak with authority on military subjects, these locks may be located against and behind Sosa Hill in such a way as to use the hill as a protection against such fire, then economy would lead to the retention of this lake. * * * If, however, Sosa Hill will not afford a site with such protection, then it seems to me wiser to place the locks at Miraflores.

In forwarding the report to Congress, the President calls attention to the change recommended by the Secretary of War in the location of the locks on the Pacific side. The so-called afterthought appears, therefore, as a conclusion reached long before I had any connection with the work.

Discredit is also thrown on the Gatun dam because there has been a desire to reduce the height from 135 to 105 feet. The original height was arbitrarily fixed to secure an excess of weight, so as to fully compress the underlying material supposed to be largely silt deposited by the river. Subsequent investigations show that the supposed compressibility does not exist; that a marine, not a river deposit is encountered. The greater the height of the dam the greater the difficulty of constructing the upper portion, and the greater the cost, both in time and money. From present available data, if the lake should take the total discharge of the Chagres River, the water surface would not exceed 90 feet; the top of the locks, 92 feet above sea level, would permit escape of the water long before it could reach the crest of the dam. Why then go to the expense of the extra height of the dam, and what is to be gained thereby? Assuming the crest of the dam as 100 feet wide, uniform slopes from the rock piles would give a height of 105 feet, and this height was suggested. Because as an additional reason it was mentioned that the pressure over the base would be more uniformly distributed by a dam with the cross section proposed, the opponents of the present project, without ascertaining the facts, point to the change as a desire to secure a uniform base pressure, and use it as an argument against the stability of the foundation.

Much also has been made of the fact that in the testimony before one of the congressional committees mention was made of securing the stability of the superstructure by balancing the dam on the underlying material. Naturally the testimony is read and discussed in such a way as to leave the impression that the entire dam is to be so constructed. The ground to be covered by the dam is crossed by three water courses, the Chagres River, the French Canal, and the West Diversion, and between these streams the ground is undulating, Spillway Hill reaching a height of 110 feet above sea level. It is not remarkable or unprecedented that there should be depressions which undrained become soft with the excessive rainfall. Except for these the ground is firm. It is in the crossing of these soft spots that slips have occurred and are liable to occur, and to which the balancing method referred. They are relatively small in extent and when drained or filled cause no trouble, as experience at the La Boca embankment clearly proves.

As previously stated, the Gatun dam satisfactorily solves the problem of the control of the Chagres, and there should be no doubt in the mind of anyone who impartially examines the data that the solution is not only feasible, but absolutely safe. As there has never been any question raised as to the safety and stability of the dams at Pedro Miguel and Miraflores, with the Gatun dam accepted, other things being equal, the relative merits of the lock versus sea-level canal must rest upon the ease and safety of navigation offered by the two types.

In the sea-level type offered in lieu of the lock type already described, the Chagres River is controlled by a masonry dam across the valley at Gamboa 4,500 feet long, 750 feet of which is subject to a pressure due to a head of 170 feet during the extreme flood stages of the river. Proper sluice gates are proposed for discharging the river into the canal. The difference in tides is overcome by means of a lock on the Pacific side in the vicinity of Sosa Hill. While provisions are made for damming or diverting some of the streams that would otherwise enter the canal prism, not less than 22 flow directly into the canal, with no provision to control the currents or check the deposits of material carried by them during flood stages.

The prism of the canal is to have a bottom width of 150 feet through the earth sections, or for nearly one-half its length, and a 200-foot bottom width through the rock sections. Nineteen miles of the length are made of curves so that the proposed sea-level canal is not a wide, straight, and open channel, connecting the two oceans, but a narrow tortuous ditch, with varying currents of unknown strength, impeded by a lock, and threatened by a dam resisting a pressure due to a head twice as great as that at Gatun.

To be sure, the partisans of the sea-level type are now proposing to eliminate both the Gamboa Dam and the tidal lock by making the channel so wide as to reduce the currents that result from the discharge of the Chagres and the difference in tides, but fail to explain how they purpose to control or divert the Chagres, the bed of which will be 50 feet above the water surface of the canal at the juncture. As data is not available for preparing accurate estimates for even such a sea-level type as was originally offered, neither they nor any one else can offer any figures as to time and cost for the construction of such a canal as they now advocate.

In any comparison, therefore, we must confine our attention to the lock type as now building, and a sea-level canal as offered by the board of engineers, and not by the idealist.

So far as the two prisms are concerned, for ease and safety of navigation the lock type is better because of the greater widths of channels, fewer and easier curves, and freedom from objectionable and troublesome currents, both from the Chagres and its tributaries. This must be admitted by all, but the exponents of the sea-level type concentrate their attention on the obstructions and dangers that the locks constitute in the lock type, and also on the dangers that will result from the failure of the Gatun dam, forgetting that at least equally great disaster must follow the failure of the Gamboa dam. The lock in the sea-level canal is not mentioned, probably because the danger is not so great, since there is but one.

Experience shows that the risks to ships in narrow waterways are material and important. In such a channel as the original Suez Canal the delays and losses to commerce were great, and the danger to ships considerable; although the benefit of the widening is striking, this is true even now.

It is well known that the narrow channels connecting the Great Lakes have been obstructed repeatedly by vessels aground or wrecked in such a manner as to block traffic. Even in the entrances to our seaports there is a frequency of accidents, which illustrate the difficulties encountered in navigating narrow and tortuous channels.

Accidents in locks have been relatively few, and none of a serious nature have occurred at the St. Marys Falls Canal during fifty-four years of its use. The risks to ships in such a narrow waterway, as proposed for the sea-level canal at Panama, far outweigh all hazards in the proposed lock canal, PROVIDED the latter is built so as to minimize the chance of accident at the locks. This is met by providing every possible safety device, by building the locks in duplicate and by the installation of a system by which the vessels will be controlled by powerful electric machinery on the lock walls, thus avoiding mistakes on the part of the vessels' crew or engine-room staff, which once led to an accident at the Manchester Ship Canal.

Again, it is objected that the size of the locks limits the canal to vessels which can use them. This is true. The present lock designs provide intermediate gates dividing the locks into lengths of 600 and

400 feet. About 98 per cent of all the ships, including the largest battle ships now building, can be passed through the 600-foot lengths, and the total lock length will accommodate the largest commercial vessels now building, which, I believe, are 1,000 feet long and 88-foot beam.

It is true that ships may increase in size so as to make the present locks obsolete, but the largest ships now afloat can not navigate the present Suez Canal, nor the proposed sea-level canal at Panama. It must also be remembered that the commerce of the world is carried by the medium-sized vessels, the length of only one of the many ships using the Suez Canal being greater than 600 feet.

The General Board of the Navy is on record that 110 foot width will be ample for the future needs of the Navy, and naval construction of the future will be limited not alone by the locks of the Panama Canal, but also by the available dry docks. Ships that can not use locks 1,000 feet by 110 feet can not use a 150-foot sea-level canal, nor can this be so easily and economically increased and maintained as is made to appear by its advocates.

Increasing the width of Culebra cut, as recently ordered, from 200 to 300 feet is advanced as an argument to show that the locks are too narrow. Ships do not navigate the locks in the sense that they do the canal prism, and the wider the channel the easier will be navigation. On account of slides that developed in Culebra cut considerably more additional work was made necessary in the upper reaches of the divide than was contemplated, and the advantages of the increased width to navigation were so great, compared with the relative amount of material to be removed in order to secure it, that the President ordered it. By this action the width of the locks is in nowise called into question.

The water supply for lockages was so exhaustively treated by the minority of the board that it has not been called into question by anyone who has carefully considered the report and data submitted therewith. Recently, however, the theory has been advanced that the water of the lake may seep through the adjacent hills or through the bottom, and is significantly referred to as a mooted question. This possibility is emphasized by the seamy quality of the rock when exposed. The French plans, with Bohio Lake, were the result of careful and protracted study and investigation, and nothing of

the kind was anticipated. The commission of 1901 was not in doubt of the resisting power of the hill covering such a flow. The report of the geologist on the general formation of the country does not lead to any such dread or fear. The reservoirs, constructed in the hills of the same geological formation as the entire lake area, are not affected by any such leakage or seepage. At Black Swamp, an extensive area between Bohio and Gatun, the water stands above the level of the Chagres—which is within half a mile—and also above sea-level the level of the water remains unchanged, clearly indicating no such leakage.

Toward the close of the last dry season certain measurements of the Chagres at Bohio indicated a less discharge there than at Gamboa; this was subsequently exploded by other observations which showed that the first ones were in error. Notwithstanding this, and in spite of the many evidences of the tightness of the earth covering, the possibility of a flow through the hills was advanced and was seized upon as another argument against the lock type.

The Board of Consulting Engineers estimated the cost of the lock type of canal at \$139,705,200, and of the sea-level canal at \$247,021,000, excluding the cost of sanitation, civil government, the purchase price, and interest on the investment. These sums were for construction purposes only.

I ventured a guess that the construction of the lock type of canal would approach \$300,000,000, and without stopping to consider that the same causes which led to an increase in cost over the original estimates for the lock canal must affect equally the sea-level type, the advocates of the latter argued that the excess of the new estimates was an additional reason why the lock type should be abandoned in favor of the sea-level canal.

The estimated cost by the present commission for completing the adopted project, excluding the items let out by the Board of Consulting Engineers, is placed at \$297,766,000. If to this be added the estimated cost of sanitation and civil government until the completion of the work, and the \$50,000,000 purchase price, the total cost to the United States of the lock type of canal will amount to \$375,201,000. In the preparation of these estimates there are no unknown factors.

The estimated cost of the sea-level canal for construction alone sums up to \$477,601,000, and if to this be added the cost of sanita-

tion and civil government up to the time of the completion of the canal, which will be at least six years later than the lock canal, and the purchase price, the total cost to the United States will aggregate \$563,000,000. In this case, however, parts of the estimate are more or less conjectural—such as the cost of diverting the Chagres to permit the building of the Gamboa dam and the cost of constructing the dam itself. Much has been said of the disadvantage of the seamy rock in connection with some experiments made at Spillway Hill test pit and of the so-called “indurated clay,” yet these same disadvantages apply to the foundation at Gamboa and the same class of material must be dealt with. The cost of constructing and maintaining a channel through the swamps of the lower Chagres is an unknown factor, and no schemes have been developed for controlling the various streams that are encountered and that must be reckoned with along the route of the canal. So that the sea-level estimates have not the accuracy of those for the lock type.

The majority of the Board of Consulting Engineers estimated that from ten to thirteen years would be required for the completion of the sea-level canal. The Isthmian Canal Commission and the then Chief Engineer fixed the time from eighteen to twenty years. It will take at least six years to complete the dam at Gamboa, and until the control of the Chagres River is assured, little if any excavation can be carried lower than 40 to 50 feet above sea level, so that in the absence of anything more definite the time needed to construct the Gamboa dam is assumed as the additional period needed for completing the sea-level type.

Much criticism has resulted because of the excess of the present estimates over those originally proposed, arising largely from a failure to analyze the two estimates, or to appreciate fully the actual conditions.

The estimates prepared and accompanying the report of the consulting engineers were based on data less complete than are available at present. The unit costs in the report of 1906 are identical with those in the report of 1901, and since 1906 there has been an increase in the wage scale and in the cost of material. On the Isthmus wages exceed those in the United States from 40 to 80 per cent for the same class of labor. The original estimates were based on a ten-hour day, but Congress imposed the eight-hour day. Subse-

quent surveys and the various changes already noted have increased the quantity of work by 50 per cent, whereas the unit costs have increased only 20 per cent—not such a bad showing. In addition, municipal improvements in Panama and Colon, advances to the Panama Railroad and moneys received and deposited to the credit of miscellaneous receipts aggregate \$15,000,000, which amount will eventually and has in part already been returned to the Treasury. Finally, no such system of housing and caring for employees was ever contemplated as has been introduced and installed, materially increasing the overhead charges and administration.

Much stress has been laid upon the fact that recent improvements in machinery have so modified conditions that the excavation can be done more economically by special devices in conjunction with dredging than is possible with the methods now adopted. The machines referred to are for shattering rock under water, and though it is claimed that such devices have given satisfactory results in connection with the Manchester Ship Canal, it is known that similar appliances have failed in certain localities in the United States where they were tried. The variations in the character of the rock on the Isthmus from soft argillaceous sandstone to hard trap are such as to make the use of such devices very problematical. Experience generally has shown that more money can be wasted on subaqueous rock excavation than in the removal of such material in the dry. Experiments are now being made on the Isthmus with one of these rock-crushing devices, but thus far the results are not promising.

Much has been written recently concerning the probable effect of earthquakes. The last earthquake of any importance occurred in the seventeenth century, and existing ruins in Panama demonstrate clearly that no shock of any violence could have occurred during the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. Should an earthquake visit the Isthmus the chances are that the effect upon the Gatun dam would be less disastrous than upon the Gamboa dam. The solid concrete construction of the locks, strengthened by reenforcements, will be as proof against any earth shocks as any structure which man builds anywhere, and the sea-level canal has as much to fear as the lock canal.

The vulnerability of the lock canal in time of war is another argument advanced in favor of the sea-level type, but has little weight, as the sea-level type is equally vulnerable from attacks by land or air

in its Gamboa dam as are tidal locks and the various devices for controlling the streams along the route.

The idea of the sea-level canal appeals to the popular mind, which pictures an open ditch offering free and unobstructed navigation from sea to sea, but no such substitute is offered for the present lock canal. As between the sea-level and the lock canal, the latter can be constructed in less time, at less cost, will give easier and safer navigation, and in addition secure such a control of the Chagres River as to make a friend and aid of what remains an enemy and menace in the sea-level type.

In this connection attention is invited to the statement made by Mr. Taft, when Secretary of War, in his letter transmitting the reports of the Board of Consulting Engineers:

We may well concede that if we could have a sea-level canal with a prism of 300 to 400 feet wide, with the curves that must now exist reduced, it would be preferable to the plan of the minority, but the time and cost of constructing such a canal are in effect prohibitive.

We are justly proud of the organization for the prosecution of the work. The force originally organized by Mr. John F. Stevens for the attack upon the continental divide has been modified and enlarged as the necessities of the situation required, until at the present time it approaches the perfection of a huge machine, and all are working together to a common end. The manner in which the work is being done and the spirit of enthusiasm that is manifested by all forcibly strikes everyone who visits the works.

The main object of our being there is the construction of the canal; everything else is subordinate to it, and the work of every department is directed to the accomplishment of that object.

In addition to the department of construction and engineering, there are the departments of sanitation and civil administration, the quartermaster's and subsistence departments, the purchasing department organized in the United States, the legal department, and the departments of examination of accounts and disbursements. Subordinated to, but acting in conjunction with, the commission is the Panama Railroad.

Too much credit can not be given to the department of sanitation, which, in conjunction with the division of municipal engineering, has wrought such a change in the conditions as they existed in 1904 as to make the construction of the canal possible. This department

is subdivided into the health department, which has charge of the hospitals, supervision of health matters in Panama and Colon, and of the quarantine, and into the sanitary inspection department, which looks after the destruction of the mosquito by various methods, by grass and brush cutting, the draining of various swampy areas, and the oiling of unavoidable pools and stagnant streams.

According to the statistics of the health department, based on the death rate, the Canal Zone is one of the healthiest communities in the world, but in this connection it must be remembered that our population consists of men and women in the prime of life, with few if any of the aged, and that a number of the sick are returned to the United States before death overtakes them.

To the sanitary department are also assigned 11 chaplains employed by the commission to attend the sick, as well as to look after the spiritual welfare of the employees. At most of the villages there is a combined church and lodge house so constructed that the lower floor is used for divine service, while the upper part provides places for meetings of the various lodges. The assignment of time to ministers and to lodges is made by the quartermaster's department.

The department of civil administration exercises supervision over the courts, which consist of three circuit and five district judges; the three former, sitting *in banc*, constitute the supreme court. The district courts take cognizance of all cases where the fine does not exceed \$100 or imprisonment does not exceed thirty days. Jury trials are restricted to crimes involving the death penalty or life imprisonment—in short, summary justice rules, and so long as the zone is nothing more nor less than a construction camp this form of law or justice will continue to be the most satisfactory.

The department of civil administration has charge also of the police force, the post-offices, collection of customs and taxes, the issue of licenses, and the public-school system. The schools are improved to such an extent that the children of the employees have very nearly the same advantages as in the United States up to and including the high-school courses.

The quartermaster's department has charge of the recruiting of labor, the care, repair, and maintenance of quarters, the collection and disposal of garbage and refuse, the issue of furniture, and the delivery of distilled water and commissary supplies to the houses of employees, and is to have charge of the construction of all new

buildings. Operating in conjunction with the purchasing department in the States, the quartermaster's department secures all supplies needed for construction and other purposes and makes purchases of materials on the Isthmus when required.

The common-labor force of the commission and the Panama Railroad aggregates in the neighborhood of 25,000 men, and consists of about 6,000 Spaniards, with a few Italians, the remainder being from the West Indies. The Spaniard is the best laborer, as he possesses more strength and endurance. Under some conditions this is not true, the foreigner strenuously objecting to doing work that requires him to stand in water.

All the skilled labor, the clerical force, and the higher officials are Americans and are recruited through the Washington office.

This department also has charge of all the property records, receives semiannual returns of property from all those to whom property has been issued, and checks the returns and inventories of the storehouses, made at certain times, with the records compiled from original invoices.

The subsistence department has charge of the commissaries and the manufacturing plants which consist of an ice and cold-storage establishment, a bread, pie, and cake bakery, a coffee-roasting outfit, and a laundry. These belong to the Panama Railroad Company, as, at the time they were established, money received from sales could be reapplied, whereas if operated by the commission the money would have reverted to the Treasury, necessitating reappropriation before the proceeds of sale could be utilized. They are, however, under the management of the subsistence officer of the commission, who has charge of the various hotels, kitchens, and messes of the commission.

There are 16 hotels from Cristobal to Panama, which serve meals to the American, or gold, employees at 30 cents per meal. There are 24 messes where meals to European laborers are served, the cost per day to such laborers being 40 cents; and there are 24 kitchens, or messes, for meals supplied to the silver laborers, or West Indians, the cost to the laborer being 30 cents per day for 3 meals. Subsistence is furnished without profit to the commission, though every effort is made to have the institutions self-supporting. The commissaries and manufacturing plants are operated at a profit so as to reimburse the Panama Railroad Company for its outlay in six years from January 1, 1909, at 4 per cent interest.

The subsistence department also has charge of the Hotel Tivoli, which is a large hotel located at Ancon, for the entertainment of the commission's employees at a comparatively low rate, and of transient guests at rates usually charged at first-class hotels.

All moneys are handled by the disbursing officer, who pays accounts that have been previously passed upon by the examiner of accounts. This last-named official makes the administrative examination required by law prior to the final audit of the accounts by the Auditor for the War Department. The pay rolls are prepared from time books kept by foremen, timekeepers, or field clerks, subsequently checked by the examiner of accounts, who maintains a force of time inspectors. The time inspectors visit each gang, generally daily, at unknown times to the foreman, timekeeper, or field clerk, and check the time books with the gangs of workmen; the inspectors report to the examiner of accounts the results of their inspection not only in connection with timekeeping, but all violations of the regulations of the commission that may come under their observation.

Payments of pay rolls are made in cash, beginning on the 12th of each month and consuming four days for the entire force on the Isthmus. All American employees and European laborers are paid in gold; all on the so-called "silver roll" are paid in Panamanian silver.

The department of construction and engineering is under the direct charge of the Chief Engineer. He is assisted by the Assistant Chief Engineer, who considers and reports upon all engineering questions submitted for final action. The Assistant Chief Engineer has charge of the designs of the locks, dams, and spillways, and supervision of these particular parts of the work. There is attached to the Chief Engineer an assistant to the chief engineer, who looks after mechanical forces on the Isthmus, and has supervision over the machine shops, the cost-keeping branch of the work, the apportionment of appropriations, and the preparation of the estimates. There is also an assistant engineer, who has charge of all general surveys, meteorological observations, and river hydraulics.

The zone is divided territorily into three divisions, each in charge of a division engineer, the first extending from deep water in the Caribbean south to include the Gatun locks and dams, known as the

"Atlantic division." The second, or "Central Division," extends from Gatun to Pedro Miguel, and includes the excavation through the continental divide. The third, or "Pacific Division," extends from Pedro Miguel, including the locks and dams of that locality, to deep water in the Pacific.

The general plans emanate from the office of the Chief Engineer and the details are left to division engineers, subject to the approval of the Chief Engineer. The whole idea of the organization in the Department of Construction and Engineering, and in fact of all the work, is to place and fix responsibility, leaving to each subordinate the carrying out of the particular part of the work intrusted to his charge.

Each division engineer has charge not only of the work involved in the construction of the canal, but all municipal engineering, including water supply, building and maintaining roads, and the establishment and maintenance of sewer systems. With the force under his charge the division engineer executes such sanitary draining as may be prescribed by the chief sanitary officer, so that all construction work, excepting the construction of buildings, concerning the location of which the division engineer is consulted, however, is directly in the hands of the division engineer.

Attached to the office of the chairman is a general Y. M. C. A. secretary, who has supervision of the commission's clubhouses, which are operated and maintained under the auspices of the Y. M. C. A. Four of these are now constructed and in operation, and four more are to be built from funds recently made available by Congress. They have done much toward securing a greater permanency to the force, in giving healthful amusement, and to a better contentment on the part of the employees.

I have endeavored to show that a channel of sufficient width, in which the waters of the many streams, especially the Chagres, will not be a menace, is one most desired for an Isthmian canal. The sea-level canal proposed by the majority of the Board of Consulting Engineers is not of sufficient width, nor is the proposed solution for the impounding and diversion of the Chagres and other streams based upon sufficient investigations to insure its success. The "ideal" sea-level canal, the Straits of Panama, recently proposed, is not based upon any investigations of the work to be done

and can not, in view of the approximate estimate of the cost of our own sea-level canal, which is about one-third the size of the "ideal" plan, be given serious consideration. Every criticism against the stability of our locks or dams can be attributed to either an argument in favor of one's own plans or to absolute ignorance of the exhaustive data concerning their safety now in existence. The several other plans of lock-type canal have nothing in their favor that the plan now adopted does not possess to a greater degree.

I have endeavored also to show that the organization on the Isthmus is compact and complete in every way, performing its duties of construction, sanitation, and government with clocklike precision. I can not do better than quote from the message recently sent to the Congress, "that hereafter attack on this type—the lock type—is in reality merely attack upon the policy of building any canal at all," for the adoption of a sea-level canal anywhere approaching the ease of navigation of the lock type will result in the ultimate abandonment of the canal; and I assure you that several years hence, no later than January 1, 1915, even the most ardent sea-level advocates will, in making the voyage through the canal, admit that the ability to navigate a battle ship at a high rate of speed through the lake and wide channel from Gatun to Pedro Miguel far outweighs the small inconveniences of the safe lockages up to and down from the summit level.

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